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Abstract
The recently announced Energy Union by the European Commission is the
most recent step in a series of developments aiming at integrating the European
Union’s (EU) gas markets in order to increase social welfare and security of gas
supply. Based on simulations with a spatial partial equilibrium model, we ana-
lyze the changes in consumption, prices, and social welfare up to 2022 induced
by the infrastructure expansions planned for this period. We find that wholesale
prices decrease slightly and converge at Western European levels, the potential
of suppliers to exert market power decreases significantly, particularly in the
Baltic countries and Finland which are the most exposed countries today, and
consumer surplus increases by 15.9% in the EU. Our results allow us to distin-
guish three categories of projects: (i) New gas sources developed and brought
to the EU markets. These projects decrease prices and increase social welfare
in a large number of countries. The only project in this category is the Trans-
Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) bringing Azeri gas to the EU; (ii) Existing
gas sources made available to additional countries. This leads to an increase
of social welfare in the newly connected countries, while social welfare drops
slightly everywhere else. These projects mainly involve pipeline and regasifica-
tion terminal capacity enhancements; (iii) Projects with a marginal effect on the
market, assuming that it is fully functioning. Most storage expansion projects
fall into this category, plus the recently announced Turkish Stream. Our results
indicate that if all proposed infrastructure projects are realized, the EU’s single
market will become a reality in 2019 when Finland is interconnected to the EU
markets. However, we also find that social welfare can only be increased signifi-
cantly for the EU as a whole if new gas sources become accessible. Consequently,
we suggest that the EU should emphasize on measures to increase the available
volumes, in particular once the integration of the market is completed. At the
same time, efficiency gains, albeit decreasing social welfare, help to improve the
situation of consumers and decrease the dependency of the EU as a whole on
external suppliers.
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU)1 is in a unique situation when it comes to the
security of gas supply. The dependency on foreign suppliers is very high com-
pared to other world regions with the exception of Japan and South Korea; in
2011, 63% of the gas consumed in the EU was imported, compared to 7% in
the United States, 22% in China, and 97% in Japan. According to the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA) [22], this dependency is expected to increase as a
consequence of growing demand and diminishing indigenous production. In ad-
dition, the six EU member states Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia,
and Slovakia import gas exclusively from Russia, which exposes them to sup-
plier bargaining and disruptions [7]. Furthermore, the markets of Eastern and
Western Europe are only weakly interconnected for historical reasons. These
physical limitations constrain trade in the day-to-day business and complicate,
or even thwart support during a crisis.
Table 1.1: Abbreviations.
Abbreviation Description
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
CEF Connecting Europe Facility
EC European Commission
ENTSO-G European Network of Transmission System Operators
for Gas
EU European Union
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
IEA International Energy Agency
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
TANAP Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline
TAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline
TYNDP Ten-Year Network Development Plan
PCI Project of Common Interest
1Abbreviations are listed in Table 1.1.
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In 2006, Russian state-controlled Gazprom, the largest non-EU supplier, cut
off its deliveries to the EU through Ukraine, the largest transit country (Stern
[29]), due to disputes over contractual issues with the Ukrainian state. This
caused major, unprecedented disruptions in EU gas supplies, which unmasked
the vulnerability of the EU gas markets, and sparked the development of a
common approach to supply security within the EU. The process eventually
lead to the formulation of an energy strategy and the proclamation of an Energy
Union by the European Commission (EC) [7, 11].
The proposed energy strategy addresses the difficulties for gas supply in
three ways: (i) short-term measures, such as improving emergency mechanisms
and coordination between member states in case of a disruption of supplies; (ii)
long-term measures strengthening the internal market, such as upgrading and
expanding the gas infrastructure and strengthening the regulatory framework.
With the establishment of the European Network of Transmission System Op-
erators for Gas (ENTSO-G) in 2009, and the Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators (ACER) in 2011, the two key institutions of a modern gas
market have been introduced to the EU level. Furthermore, the Connecting Eu-
rope Facility (CEF) incentivizes market forces to improve security of gas supply
by identifying and co-funding otherwise unprofitable Projects of Common Inter-
est (PCI) (EC [10]); and (iii) long-term measures improving the EU’s position
versus external partners. This includes promoting gas production and energy
efficiency measures in the EU to minimize overall dependency on external sup-
pliers, diversifying external sources and developing the associated infrastructure,
and supporting the contract negotiations of member states with external sup-
pliers to make best use of the bargaining power inherent to the EU gas market
as a whole.
Although these measures were developed as a consequence of an emergency
situation, they also affect the markets when undisturbed. As most of these mea-
sures will be implemented in the upcoming years, the EU gas market is about
to transform significantly. In this paper, we investigate this transformation in
detail, in particular the influence of infrastructure expansions on the market un-
der normal operation. To this end, we estimate the gas prices and consumption
in the time span from 2013 to 2022 while taking projected changes in demand,
production capacity, and infrastructure into account. Furthermore, we assess
diversity of suppliers in each EU member state and Switzerland2, the potential
of suppliers to exert market power, and consumer and producer surpluses. Fi-
nally, we identify the infrastructure projects contributing most to the intended
market integration and analyze them in detail.
Our study is based on a spatial partial equilibrium model of the gas market
of Europe and its main suppliers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study analyzing the stated aspects for Europe as a whole for the period
of 2013 to 2022. We understand this work as a complement to the numerous
2In the following we will implicitly include Switzerland when we speak about the EU and
its member states.
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studies emphasizing particular aspects or regions of the European gas market.
Examples include Egging et al. [14] estimating how European consumers are
affected by a disruption of Russian or Algerian supplies, Lochner & Dieckho¨ner
[25] assessing the consequences of the civil unrest in North Africa, Chyong &
Hobbs [5] analyzing the economics of the (meanwhile canceled) South Stream
project, or Cobanli [6] investigating the dynamics between the Central Asian
gas producers, Russia, and the large consumer markets in Europe and China.
In contrast to these studies we aim at taking a holistic view on the development
of the EU markets.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the
model, data sources and assumptions underlying our study, and outline the
calibration procedure. In Section 3, we describe the simulation runs conducted
to assess our research questions. In Section 4, we present our results and discuss
their implications for the EU gas market. We conclude our paper with Section 5
and give an outlook on potential future research topics.
2. Model
2.1. General setting
The spatial partial equilibrium model introduced by Baltensperger et al. [3]
is used throughout this study. The model equations and an exemplary model
with two interconnected nodes are shown in Appendix A. The model allows one
to simulate the gas markets during one year, and distinguishes a summer and
a winter period. We largely adopted the geographical and temporal settings
on which the Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) by ENTSO-G
[15] is based, since this source provides detailed data on future infrastructure
projects, demand and supply affecting the EU gas markets. We include all
major producers, which supply gas to the EU, and all EU member states except
Cyprus and Malta in our simulations (Table 2.1). Each country is modeled as a
node, and the model arcs represent the total capacity of pipelines and liquefied
natural gas (LNG) shipments between each pair of nodes. The resulting model
consists of 43 nodes and 247 arcs, and is represented by 9432 complementarity
conditions.
In the following, we summarize the data sources used and the main assump-
tions made during the modeling process. We refer to Appendix A.3 for an
overview of the notation, and to ENTSO-G [15] and Baltensperger et al. [3] for
additional background information.
2.2. Modeling of consumption and prices
The gas consumption sCnt and wholesale market price λ
C
nt in each country
n and time period t are variables of the model and are coupled by the inverse
demand function Λnt(s
C
nt) = INTnt + SLPnt · s
C
nt, where λ
C
nt = Λnt(s
C
nt) in
equilibrium (cf. Equation (A.1k)). The intercept and slope are defined as:
INTnt :=(1−
1
ηC0nt
) · λC0nt , (2.1)
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Table 2.1: Modeled consumers and suppliers. We group the consuming countries in
“Western European” and “Eastern European” as described below. The usage of these
terms is determined by the geographical location of a country and does not coincide
with the historical political division of Europe. Most EU member states produce
some gas, but the volumes are generally low compared to the domestic consumption
which is why we exempt them from international trade. International suppliers are
marked by N if they are connected to the ENTSO-G network via pipeline, and by
L if they deliver gas to the EU market via LNG.
Western EU
consumers
Austria, Belgium, DenmarkN , France, Germany, United
KingdomN , Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
NetherlandsN , Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
Eastern EU
consumers
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia
Non-EU sup-
pliers
AlgeriaN,L, AzerbaijanN , EgyptL, LibyaN , NigeriaL,
NorwayN,L, OmanL, PeruL, QatarL, RussiaN , Trinidad
& TobagoL, and YemenL
SLPnt :=
λC0nt
sC0nt · η
C0
nt
, (2.2)
where the parameters sC0nt , λ
C0
nt , and η
C0
nt are referred to as demand, willingness
to pay, and price elasticity of demand, respectively. The parameter values are
based on data of historical and estimates of future consumption sC,datant , prices
λ
C,data
nt , price elasticities η
C,data
nt , and the quantities q
C,data
fnt sold by individual
suppliers f on the wholesale market n in time period t. The exact values are
determined in the calibration process, which is outlined in Section 2.7. In this
section, we introduce the data sources of sC,datant , λ
C,data
nt , η
C,data
nt , and q
C,data
fnt .
For sC,datant , we adopted the projected yearly average demands from ENTSO-G
[15], and multiplied them by a seasonality factor, which was calculated from the
monthly consumption in the years 2008-2012 reported by the EC [12] and the
IEA [19, 21].
Wholesale prices λC,datant are available for almost all EU-countries from the
EC [8, 9] for the first and second quarter of 2013. We adopted the average of
these prices for the year 2013 and completed the missing prices with information
from the International Gas Union (IGU) [23] or adopted the price of a neighbor-
ing country. For 2014-2022, only general trends are available. Hence, we used
2013-prices and adopted the average price change rate estimated for Europe in
the New Policies Scenario by IEA [22], which amounts to 0.23%/year. The price
development of the New Policies Scenario was chosen as a reference since the
scenario’s demand forecast is very similar to the one assumed in the TYNDP
[15], on which the bulk of the remaining parameter values are based.
For the price elasticities ηC,datant we followed Lise et al. [24], who distinguish
the three sectors industry, households and commerce, and electricity produc-
tion. The sectoral price elasticities were weighted by the historical shares of the
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corresponding sector and summed. The shares were obtained from the TYNDP
[15] and the United Nations (UN) [33].
q
C,data
fnt are only required for the calibration year, which is 2013 in our case.
The data is available from the EC [12] for most EU countries.
Note that the wholesale markets are only modeled in EU member states,
because we concentrate on these countries in our study. For all other coun-
tries, we do not model the markets and therefore do not obtain information on
consumption and prices.
2.3. Production modeling
Each producer outside the EU is modeled by an individual node and produces
at most the volume reported by ENTSO-G [15] to be available for the EU-
market in 2013. This is different from the TYNDP, where all LNG exporters
are lumped together in a single node connected to all importing countries. We
generated the missing data by splitting the reported available volume of LNG
among all LNG traders proportionally to their LNG shares in the EU market in
2013. The shares were obtained from BP [4]. Note that by applying this rule we
exclude potential future suppliers, like the United States, from our calculations
and instead assume that the maximum output of the current LNG suppliers
changes proportionally over the simulation horizon.
As for the EU producers, only the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
Denmark are modeled as international traders, while all other EU member states
are restricted to trade domestically, since these countries produce far less than
they consume. We assume the production costs to be a quadratic function of
the quantity produced and base our parameters on Egging et al. [14] and IEA
[20].
2.4. Transportation modeling
The two main ways of transporting gas over long distances are by pipeline
under high pressure and by ship in liquid state. Between each pair of nodes,
we lump all transport capacities together, while within a node we assume that
gas flow is unconstrained, partly because not all necessary data is available on
a sub-country level. This assumption is sufficiently close to reality for all EU
member states except France that has a bottleneck between its northern and
southern zone. This situation will not change before 2019 and might be relevant
when interpreting the results.
The pipeline capacities were obtained from the TYNDP [15] for the entire
simulation horizon. We updated the assumed completion dates for the planned
projects according to the EC [13]. Consequently, neither Nabucco nor South
Stream were included in our data set, since these projects have been canceled
in the meantime. Instead, we included the recently announced Turkish Stream
pipeline. The aim of the project is to install four lines with a capacity of 15.75
billion cubic meters per year(bcm/y) each. According to Stern et al. [30], the first
pipeline is destined to supply Turkish consumers, while the others are planned to
supply EU consumers. However, due to a lack of infrastructure to transport the
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gas from the Greek-Turkish border to the large EU consumer markets, the third
and forth line are unlikely to be built before 2022. Hence, we only included one
line (corresponding to the second line in the project) in our simulations, and
assumed that line to be on-line in 2022. We will discuss the effects of this
assumption in Section 4.4.
The transportation costs were derived from Chyong & Hobbs [5] and the
information provided by the Observatoire Me´diterrane´en de l’Energie [26] for
pipelines outside the EU borders. For pipelines inside the EU borders, we
adopted average tariffs charged by the national transmission system operators
based on Arthur D. Little [1] and the operators’ websites. Pipeline losses were
set to zero since the quantities are compensated by the transmission system
operator and the costs are included in the tariffs.
For the LNG chain we made the following assumptions: For liquefaction we
followed Shively et al. [27, Section 3] and separately accounted for fuel con-
sumption and liquefaction cost. For LNG shipments we assumed that the vessel
is fully run with boil-off gas and assigned that quantity as a loss, which was
obtained from Heede [18]. The costs were calculated as vessel rent plus a flat
figure covering all other charges, including harbor fees and canal payments;
these figures were obtained from Timera Energy [31]. Regasification costs were
adopted from Chyong & Hobbs [5], and losses were set to zero since they are
already included in the price charged by the facility and are contained in the
respective country’s gas balance.
2.5. Storage modeling
Storage facilities were included in the model to account for the impact of
seasonality in gas consumption on the markets. The storage volumes as well
as maximum injection and extraction rates were obtained from ENTSO-G [15].
For storage costs, we followed Egging et al. [14] and assigned costs and losses
separately since the storage operator does often not compensate and charge for
the losses, see for instance Fluxys Belgium SA [17].
2.6. Gas traders and market power exertion
We assume that each gas producing company has an internal trading-arm
which is responsible for the distribution of the gas in the domestic and foreign
markets, and we call this trading-arm “trader”. Each trader buys gas from
his producer at marginal cost, and transports it to the destination markets.
Pipelines outside the EU borders are not accessible to traders other than the
owner. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the Russian gas transit
network, which cannot be used to transport gas between EU countries although
this would technically be feasible.
Once the gas arrives at the destination node, the trader sells it on the whole-
sale market. Traders can exert market power over consumers, which is modeled
based on a conjectural variations approach ([32, Chapter 12]). The level of the
market power parameter θfnt ∈ [0, 1] determines the behavior of the traders in
the market, and can be different for each trader f , market n, and time period
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t. If θfnt = 0, the trader f is a price taker in the respective market and time
period. For θfnt > 0, the price elasticity of the consumers in market f and
time period t is known to trader f and is taken into account when maximizing
profits. θfnt is determined in the calibration process, which is outlined below.
2.7. Calibration
The model was calibrated with an earlier version of the algorithm proposed
by Baltensperger et al. [2], which is introduced briefly in the following. The
algorithm aims at equalizing the consumption sCnt to the reported values s
C,data
nt
in all nodes n and time periods t in 2013, and at keeping the difference between
the volumes sold by each trader f in each market n and time period t and the
respective reported values low (|qCfnt−q
C,data
fnt |). These goals are linked, since the
consumption is equal to the sum of sales of the traders to a particular market:
sCnt =
∑
f∈F
qCfnt.
To achieve these goals, the algorithm tunes three groups of parameters within
certain bounds: (i) the willingness to pay of the consumers, λC0nt ∈ [λ
C,data
nt ·0.85,
λ
C,data
nt ·1.15], (ii) the price elasticity of the consumers, η
C0
nt ∈ [max{−1, η
C,data
nt −
0.2}, min{−0.3, ηC,datant + 0.2}], and (iii) the market power parameters of the
traders, θfnt ∈ [0, 1]. As described by Baltensperger et al. [2], there is a tradeoff
between tight bounds on λC0nt and η
C0
nt and low
∣∣∣qCfnt − qC,datafnt
∣∣∣ for all traders f
in a particular market n and time period t; it is up to the modeler to balance
these objectives by setting the bounds accordingly. We chose the bounds stated
above to comply with the range of ηC0nt resulting from the calibration procedure
used by Chyong & Hobbs [5], and to allow the typical seasonal fluctuations of
λC0nt .
Before running the calibration procedure, the reference sales of the traders
q
C,data
fnt were adjusted such that they were consistent with the consumption
s
C,data
nt and below the production capacity limit CAP
P
nt in each node n and
time period t. The adjusted reference sales qC,data∗fnt were deduced by pro-
portionally reducing qC,datafnt such that
∑
f∈F
q
C,data∗
fnt ≤ s
C,data
nt for all n, t, and
∑
n′∈N (f)
q
C,data∗
fn′t ≤ CAP
P
n∗(f)t for all f ∈ F(n), t, where n
∗(f) is the node trader
f draws its gas from. In the calibration process, the qC,data∗fnt were used as lower
bounds on qCfnt.
These adjustments cut the original values by 32% on average, whereas the
changes occured in countries with high re-export volumes like Belgium. This is
because re-exports are statistically recorded but are not modeled in our frame-
work; instead, traders are in possession of the gas until they sell it on the whole-
sale market (Section 2.6). Ultimately, the low qC,data∗fnt increase the flexibility
when determining feasible qCfnt in the calibration process. As the flexibility is
added in the EU area in our model, which is increasingly flexible in reality any-
way, we do not expect the adjustments to distort the validity of our simulation
8
results, even though the differences between the adjusted and original values
are relatively high.
Table 2.2 gives an overview over the deviations of sC0nt , λ
C0
nt , and η
C0
nt , and
qCfnt from s
C,data
nt , λ
C,data
nt , η
C,data
nt , and q
C,data∗
fnt . Note that seasonal data is only
available for sC,datant and q
C,data∗
fnt ; for λ
C,data
nt and η
C,data
nt we show the yearly
average values as a reference. The calibrated market power parameter values
θfnt are shown in Table B.1.
Table 2.2: Calibrated variables and parameters and their deviations from the re-
ported values. For qC
fnt
, only the values for negative deviation are shown, since the
available data only provides a lower limit on the flows. The figures are given in
million cubic meters per day (mcm/d) and thousand Euros per million cubic meters
(ke/mcm), respectively.
Parameter/ Deviation from reported value
Variable max., absolute max., relative mean median
sC0nt 0.99mcm/d 2.38% −0.02mcm/d 0.00mcm/d
λC0nt 34.2 ke/mcm 13.3% 8.33 ke/mcm 14.7 ke/mcm
ηC0nt 0.20 57.2% 0.05 0.10
qCfnt 17.5mcm/d 100% −0.21mcm/d 0.00mcm/d
As Table 2.2 shows, the total consumption sC0nt and the sales per trader q
C
fnt
fit the reported data very well for all nodes n and time periods t in 2013, while
the prices λC0nt and price elasticities η
C0
nt remain inside their predefined bounds.
In a final step, we derived the intercepts INTCnt and slopes SLP
C
nt of the affine
inverse demand functions from our calibrated parameters for the markets n and
time periods t in 2013. For 2014-2022, we assigned the consumption projected
by ENTSO-G [15] to sC0nt , adopted the growth-adjusted λ
C0
nt , and assumed that
the calibrated ηC0nt and θfnt remain constant over the simulation horizon.
Note that we do not model any long-term contracts, neither for LNG nor for
piped gas, as the effects on price formation are largely captured by the effects of
parameter θfnt. According to Smeers [28], competition authorities argue that
the overall price levels would be lower if all volumes were spot-traded, because
the current lack of transparency and liquidity of the market can be used by the
suppliers to ask for prices higher than marginal costs, which is exactly what
we model by θfnt. The only aspect of the long-term contracts which cannot be
grasped with our approach is the lock-in effect over time: the model outcome
changes immediately when new infrastructure goes into operation. In reality,
the new infrastructure indeed puts pressure on existing contracts to adjust prices
towards the new standards, but several years could pass before new contracts
are put into place. In this light, the model outcome reflects the equilibrium
towards which the markets converge in the long-run and cannot serve for a
precise forecast of future consumption and prices.
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3. Simulation runs
To assess the development of the EU gas market we carried out a series
of simulations for each year over the horizon. Table 3.1 summarizes how we
varied the parameters in each run, and an example for the year 2019 is given
in Table 4.1. First, the status of the gas market in the previous year (y-1) was
determined (Simulation SIM y,0). Then, we successively switched parameters
to values of the current year (y) and assessed the induced changes: In SIM y,1,
we set demand and willingness to pay in all countries to the levels of year y,
while leaving all other parameter values at (y-1)-levels. In SIM y,2, we set all
production and liquefaction capacities to year y-levels while leaving all other
parameters at (y-1)-levels. In SIM y,3, we assessed the joint influence on the
market of updated demand, willingness to pay, production and liquefaction
capacities.
Table 3.1: Parameter settings in the simulation runs. ×: parameter is updated to
the level of year y. o: Parameter is not updated and is at the level of the previous
year. Call : Consumer behavior: assumed levels of demand and willingness to pay in
all countries. {P ,L}all : Expansion levels of production and liquefaction capacities in
all countries. {R, S ,A}i, i ∈ {1, ky}: Expansion levels of the regasification terminals,
storage facilities, and pipeline capacities. ky: number of infrastructure expansions
in year y.
Simulation State of infrastructure
runs Call {P,L}all {R,S ,A}1 . . . {R, S ,A}ky
SIM y,0 o o o . . . o
SIM y,1 × o o . . . o
SIM y,2 o × o . . . o
SIM y,3 × × o . . . o
SIM y,4 × × × o o
...
...
... o
. . . o
SIM y,ky+3 × × o o ×
SIM y,ky+4 × × × . . . ×
For the remaining ky simulations in year y, the capacities of the regasification
terminals, storage facilities and pipelines were updated for each country individ-
ually. ky is the number of planned infrastructure expansions in year y, and varies
between 8 and 27. These simulations are labeled SIM y,ID , ID ∈ {4, . . . , ky+3}.
All simulations SIM y,ID also include the updated values for demand, willingness
to pay, production and liquefaction capacities. The final simulation SIM y,ky+4
takes into account the effects of all changes in year y, and thus corresponds to
SIM y+1,0.
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We assess the changes introduced by specific infrastructures by comparing
pairs of simulation outcomes: SIM y,1, SIM y,2, and SIM y,3 are compared to
SIM y,0, while all other simulations of year y are compared to SIM y,3. Note
that for y = 2013 we only calculated SIM y,ky+4, since for all other simulations
the corresponding reference scenario in y = 2012 could not be calculated due to
lack of data.
We aware of the fact that this assessment is incomplete since complementary
and substitution effects between infrastructure elements are not accounted for.
Moreover, it is only valid for a specific point in time – if the reference situation
changes, which happens very frequently in the gas market, the assessment needs
to be updated. However, these deficits could only be overcome by analyzing each
infrastructure element in detail and over time, which is in conflict with our aim
to capture the big picture for the European market. We accept the limitations
of the chosen approach and consider them when analyzing the results.
Our study comprises 208 simulation runs in total. These were carried out
on a quad-core 3.4GHz CPU and each took in average 5 seconds to complete
(including overhead, using MATLAB and the PATH solver), resulting in an
overall simulation time of approximately 17minutes.
4. Results
4.1. Development of consumption and market shares of suppliers
Figure 4.1 depicts the consumption development over the simulation hori-
zon and the market shares of the major suppliers in each EU member state.
First, we note that consumption grows in most countries and in the EU as a
whole within the next decade, with particularly high rates (>40%) in Portugal,
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria. The growth in consumption
follows the values projected by ENTSO-G [15] for most countries; this is not
surprising, since the ENTSO-G values define the inverse demand function in
our model, which in turn drives the growth in consumption. Hence, interesting
cases include Lithuania, for which ENTSO-G [15] projects a decline in con-
sumption, whereas our simulations indicate an increase, and Latvia, Estonia,
Finland, Greece, Bulgaria, and Croatia, for which our calculations indicate a
substantially larger growth than projected by ENTSO-G [15]. These deviations
originate from our more detailed representation of the effects of infrastructure
development on prices and consumption: Our model shows immediate price
reductions and consumption increases in regions which are newly or better con-
nected to gas sources, whereas in the TYNDP, consumption development for
most countries is based on GDP and population growth figures, which are con-
siderably less responsive to particular infrastructure expansions. Overall, our
results indicate that EU-wide consumption grows by 145mcm/d or 11% over the
horizon (Appendix C), which is slightly more than projected by ENTSO-G [15]
from 2016 onwards, with a peak of +2.9% (relative to the total consumption in
2013) in 2020.
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Bars: Total consumption relative to 2013 and supplier market shares [%]
Red marks: ENTSO-G projection of consumption relative to 2013 [%]
Black/white marks: Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) divided by 100
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Regarding the market shares of the traders, we can observe multiple major
developments. First, the share of domestic production decreases in all coun-
tries except Ireland, Sweden, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. This is mostly driven
by the growth rates in production capacities which are, similarly as the pro-
jected changes in demand, exogenous to the model and are negative for most
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Figure 4.1: Gas consumption over time and market shares of suppliers in each
country and the EU as a whole (obtained from SIM y,ky+4, y ∈ {2013, . . . , 2022}.
For each country a group of 10 bars is displayed representing the gas consumption
in the years 2013-2022 from top to bottom. The width of the bars is normalized
to the consumption in 2013. Each bar is divided into at most 10 sections, with
each section representing a share of a supplier in a country and year. For the EU,
“Domestic production” indicates the share of gas produced and consumed in the same
country, while the Danish, British, and Dutch shares represent gas of those countries
consumed abroad (but still within the EU). The share of total EU production is
therefore the sum of the domestic, Danish, British, and Dutch production. The red
marks indicate the demand projected by ENTSO-G [15] over the horizon, which was
taken as calibration point for the inverse demand function. The black/white marks
indicate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) divided by 100.
EU countries. This induces the second major trend: imports from non-EU
countries increase significantly, particularly from Russia and LNG traders, and
after 2019 from Azerbaijan, to make up for the increase in consumption and
the decline in domestic production. The third major trend is the diversifica-
tion of suppliers in some highly exposed countries: the Baltic states, Finland,
and Bulgaria. Starting in 2015, the Baltic states and Bulgaria reduce their de-
pendency on Russian gas by increasing imports from other suppliers; Finland
follows the same path starting in 2019. To quantify this trend, we calculate the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is defined as the sum of the squares
of the market shares of the suppliers in a market, and is measure of market con-
centration. Although the HHI falls below 6000 in the Baltic states and Finland,
and to approximately 3000 in Bulgaria, these markets remain highly concen-
trated3. Other Eastern European countries, such as Romania, Slovakia, and
Poland, experience a contraction of supplier diversity, mainly because the grow-
ing gap between consumption and production is covered by additional Russian
imports, which were already high before, and are among the countries with the
highest market concentrations by 2022. Lastly, note that the HHI of the EU as a
whole remains roughly constant at a moderate level implying that diversification
of suppliers is a regional problem in the first place.
4.2. Price composition development and market power exertion
Figure 4.2 displays the price development in 2013-2022. In most markets,
the prices follow a similar pattern: they first increase and peak in 2015, then
decrease until 2020, and finally increase again slightly. These movements re-
flect the ratio of total available production capacity to total demand over time.
Eastern European countries experience significant infrastructure expansions in
transportation volumes relative to their consumed quantities. As a consequence,
prices drop more significantly in Eastern than in Western Europe, and the prices
converge to a level of 300-320 ke/mcm by 2022. This overall trend contrasts the
3The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission [34] characterize
markets with a HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, between 1500 and 2500 as moderately
concentrated, and above 2500 as highly concentrated.
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Figure 4.2: Wholesale price composition over time in the EU. For each country, a
series of 10 bars is displayed representing the prices in 2013-2022 from top to bottom.
Each bar is divided into at most 9 sections. Each section represents a fraction of
the costs and indicates at which stage in the supply chain it arises. The red marks
indicate the price forecasts as introduced in Section 2.2.
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generally slightly increasing prices predicted by the IEA [22], but is, however,
in line with our previous results which indicated a larger than predicted con-
sumption (Section 4.1).
Wholesale prices comprise three types of costs: (i) the costs arising through-
out the supply chain from production and service usage; (ii) the profits of the
producers and service providers, originating from the fact that the price levels
are above marginal costs for most of the gas produced; and (iii) the profits of
the traders, which are greater than zero if traders exert market power over con-
sumers, and zero otherwise. The price components can be calculated for every
given situation as they are a function of the market equilibrium and the associ-
ated costs of each stage in the supply chain. However, as soon as the sales of the
traders in the individual markets change, the cost calculation has to be redone.
As we see from Figure 4.2, the movements are smooth over the time horizon,
however, they are largely unpredictable for an alternative situation without re-
running the model. This implies that the results cannot be extrapolated to
similar market situations; for instance, if none of the traders would exert mar-
ket power (all else equal), prices would not fall exactly by the traders’ profits.
Prices would indeed fall, because traders have no incentive to withhold gas from
consumers and therefore the overall available gas increases. However, we would
also see two additional effects: On one hand, lower prices increase consumption,
and thus production and network congestion; On the other hand, perfectly com-
petitive traders have no incentive to diversify consumers (Baltensperger et al.
[3]) and therefore are likely to ship gas to nearby markets to save transport
costs, which reduces network congestion. How the combination of these effects
influences the wholesale price can only be quantified by rerunning the model.
As Figure 4.2 shows, the largest price components are the producers’ profits,
the traders’ profits, and in some regions the producers’ costs. The other services’
costs are comparatively low, and their profits negligible. Furthermore, the price
composition varies from region to region, and changes significantly over time. In
the Baltic countries and Finland the traders’ profits are the highest throughout
the EU and make up for more than 50% of the final price in the first years of
the simulation horizon. In 2015 and 2019, respectively, these countries are con-
nected to the global gas market after a regasification terminal is commissioned
in Lithuania in 2015, and a connection to the ENTSO-G network is established
in 2019 (see Appendix C for all the infrastructure changes). This allows traders
other than Russia to enter the market, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
At the other extreme, the largest part of the prices on the Iberian peninsula
are made up from the producers profits. This is a consequence of the market
clearing at the marginal costs of the most expensive producer (adjusted by
transportation and storage costs), and production costs varying significantly
among the producers.
For most other countries, the costs are more evenly distributed along the
supply chain. The fractions of the producers’ costs and profits are larger in
Western than Eastern Europe, because most local gas supplies are more expen-
sive to produce and distances to low-cost gas sources are higher. In Eastern
Europe, comparably cheap Russian gas is abundant, however, these countries
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are not as flexible in their supplier choice due to infrastructure constraints.
Therefore the traders present in those markets, above all the Russian trader,
make higher profits than their counterparts in Western European markets. For
Eastern European countries, we see in Figure 4.2 that the traders’ profits de-
crease over time, as infrastructural constraints diminish, until the wholesale
prices reach Western European levels.
4.3. Social welfare analysis
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Figure 4.3: Social welfare development over time. Subplots 1-3 show the develop-
ment of the consumer surplus in the EU, the producer surplus in the EU, and the
producer surplus of all non-EU countries supplying the EU. The bars on the left-
hand side in every year show the effects on consumer and producer surplus caused
by changes in production capacities, liquefaction capacities, demand, and willingness
to pay (SIM y,3 − SIM y,0), while the bars on the right-hand side show the effects
induced by the expansions of the other infrastructure types (SIM y,ky+4 − SIM y,3).
Green indicates a growth, and red a decline.
As Figure 4.3 indicates, the consumer surplus in the EU increases by 17.0%
from 2013 to 2020, and then decreases slightly to a total of +15.9% over the
simulation horizon. The surplus of the producers within the EU is one order of
magnitude smaller than the consumer surplus. After a slight increase in 2014
and 2015, it decreases by a total of 31.6% over the horizon. The main reason
for this decrease is the declining production in the EU (see also Figure 4.1).
For producers outside the EU, the surplus remains roughly constant over the
simulation horizon.
When comparing the left-hand and right-hand side bars, we note that only in
2019 the consumer surplus increases significantly from infrastructure expansions,
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despite the numerous expansions planned over the simulation horizon. All other
changes in consumer surplus are predominantly from the favorable development
of production capacities in relation to demand and willingness to pay. As this
is a rather unexpected result, we will analyze the situation in 2019 in detail in
the remainder of this section.
Table 4.1 lists all infrastructure expansions planned to come on-line during
2019 and their impact on social welfare. The most influential projects in terms
of social welfare changes summed over all EU countries are shown in italics, and
their consequences on consumer and producer surplus detailed in Figure 4.4.
Due to complementary or substitution effects of the projects, the sum of their
individual impacts on social welfare does not match the total social welfare
change at the end of 2019. Nevertheless, analyzing individual projects hints at
the geographical region they influence and the magnitude of their impact.
Table 4.1: Impacts of infrastructure expansions and changes in demand on the mar-
ket for the year 2019, listed by simulation ID , where SIM 2019,ID is the corresponding
simulation. The changes in EU social welfare in SIM 2019,ID , ID ∈ {1, 2, 3} are rela-
tive to SIM 2019,0, while all other changes are relative to SIM 2019,3 (cf. Section 3).
The regasification, storage, and pipeline expansions with highest impact on social
welfare in the EU are highlighted in italics. Further details on those simulations are
provided in Figure 4.4. Me/y: Million Euros per year.
ID Infrastructure expansion Original Capacity Total EU
capacity change social wel-
fare change
Production, liquefaction, and demand, relative to SIM 2019,0
1 Production and liquefaction capacity changes in all countries -1015Me/y
2 Demand and willingness to pay changes in all countries 606Me/y
3 Combined effects from SIM 2019,1 and SIM 2019,2 -587Me/y
Regasification terminals
4 Spain 206mcm/d 5mcm/d 0Me/y
5 France 144mcm/d 5mcm/d 0Me/y
6 Italy 172mcm/d 24mcm/d 0Me/y
7 Finland 0mcm/d 19mcm/d +87Me/y
Storage facilities
8 Spain, extraction 60mcm/d 1mcm/d 0Me/y
9 Germany, injection 212mcm/d 13mcm/d
Germany, extraction 541mcm/d 13mcm/d
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – Continued from previous page
ID Infrastructure expansion Original Capacity Total EU
capacity change social wel-
fare change
Germany, capacity 22525mcm 120mcm 0Me/y
10 Czech Republic, extraction 85mcm/d 1mcm/d 0Me/y
Pipelines
11 Austria → Germany 30mcm/d 6mcm/d 0Me/y
12 Austria → Italy 104mcm/d 29mcm/d 0Me/y
13 Switzerland → France 0mcm/d 9mcm/d 2Me/y
14 Germany → Austria 38mcm/d 26mcm/d 0Me/y
15 Estonia → Finland 0mcm/d 7mcm/d +72Me/y
16 Finland → Estonia 0mcm/d 7mcm/d 0Me/y
17 France → Luxembourg 0mcm/d 4mcm/d +1Me/y
18 Greece → Italy 0mcm/d 61mcm/d 0Me/y
19 Italy → Austria 18mcm/d 6mcm/d -23Me/y
20 Italy → Greece 0mcm/d 48mcm/d +170Me/y
21 Lithuania → Poland 0mcm/d 3mcm/d 0Me/y
22 Azerbaijan → Greece 0mcm/d 66mcm/d +2409Me/y
23 The Netherlands → Germany 143mcm/d 6mcm/d 0Me/y
24 Poland → Lithuania 0mcm/d 6mcm/d +65Me/y
25 Poland → Slovakia 0mcm/d 12mcm/d -1Me/y
26 Slovenia → Italy 27mcm/d 2mcm/d 0Me/y
27 Slovakia → Poland 0mcm/d 16mcm/d 0Me/y
28 Effect of the combination of all expansions 4-27 +3456Me/y
As Table 4.1 shows, the new connection from Azerbaijan to Greece, also
known as Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), contributes significantly
to the overall changes in social welfare in 2019 (SIM 2019,22). By comparing
“Pipeline AZ-GR” to “All changes 2019” in Figure 4.4, we also notice that most
of the effects on social welfare are similar, which suggests that they originate
from the TANAP. The TANAP increases consumer surplus between 5Me/y (Es-
tonia) and 665Me/y (Italy), which corresponds to an increase of 1-2% for most
countries, and 5.2% in Greece (Appendix C). This leads to a massive boost in
consumer surplus of 3.2 billion Euros per year in the EU as a whole, while pro-
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Figure 4.4: Changes in consumer and producer surplus in the EU-member
states and in the EU as a whole from infrastructure expansions in 2019. Re-
sults are shown for five individual infrastructure expansions (SIM 2019,ID , for ID ∈
{7, 15, 20, 22, 24}), and for all changes taking place together (SIM 2019,28, correspond-
ing to the infrastructure state at the end of 2019). For each country, the top bar
represents the change in consumer surplus, while the bottom bar indicates the change
in producer surplus, compared to SIM 2019,3 . Abbreviations: FI: Finland. EE: Es-
tonia. IT: Italy. GR: Greece. AZ: Azerbaijan. PL: Poland. LT: Lithuania.
ducer surplus in the EU decreases by 0.8Be/year. The second important project
in Southeastern Europe is the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) connecting Greece
and Italy. As shown in Figure 4.4 mainly Greece and Hungary can benefit from
this, while most other countries see a slight decrease in consumer surplus. How-
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ever, when we analyze the situation at the end of 2019, we see that the joint
installation of all infrastructure planned for 2019 boosts consumer surplus in
Italy to a higher level. This is because in SIM 2019,28 the TAP and the TANAP
are both active, allowing Azeri gas to be traded all over Europe, and particu-
larly in Italy. This illustrates well how the market impact of two complementary
pipelines can be underestimated when assessing them individually. Also note
the drop of the wholesale price and the traders’ profits in Greece induced by
these infrastructure expansions (Figure 4.2).
The second region where projects with high impact are implemented is
Northeastern Europe: a regasification terminal is installed in Finland, and two
pipelines connecting Estonia with Finland, and Poland with Lithuania are com-
missioned. As a consequence, we see prices drop between 68 ke/mcm (Finland)
and 11 ke/mcm (Estonia) compared to 2018 (Figure 4.2), and consumer surplus
change by +437Me/y or +13% (thereof +337Me/y in Finland corresponding to
a 25% increase; percentages are calculated from Appendix C). This is because
the additional infrastructure allows British, Dutch and Norwegian gas to be
traded in the region (Figure 4.1). This increases average gas production costs
by more than 50%, but also significantly lowers the traders’ profits (Figure 4.2).
Overall, prices in the Baltic region move close to Western European levels, in-
dicating that the region is well interconnected to the rest of the market after
2019.
As Figure 4.4 shows, producer surplus falls significantly for all EU producers.
The volumes brought to the EU markets by Azerbaijan induce a high pressure
on prices and market shares of the other traders, and as a consequence, their
surpluses decrease. However, we can observe from Figure 4.3 that consumer
and producer surplus do not always move in opposite directions. For instance
in 2014 and 2015, consumer and producer surplus in- and outside the EU grow,
because the changes in demand, willingness to pay, and production capacities
are in favor of both, the consumers and the producers, and therefore benefits
are shared among them.
4.4. Categorization of projects
The results presented above allow us to classify the infrastructure projects
foreseen for the coming decade into three categories. Note that there is some
uncertainty inherent to this categorization as we only assessed projects individ-
ually, and only at the point in time they are commissioned. The first category
contains projects significantly boosting social welfare in the EU as a whole. The
only project fulfilling this criterion is the TANAP. This project is unique since
it makes large quantities accessible for the EU market at a comparably low
price. The consequences can be felt all over Europe as the changes in consumer
and producer surplus are significant in most countries.
A second group of projects does not add significant amounts of gas to the EU
market, but instead changes the distribution of gas within the market. Examples
include the ones presented in Figure 4.4. As depicted, these projects mainly
benefit the destination regions, while most other countries lose consumer and
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producer surplus, which lowers the overall social welfare gains EU-wide, or even
turns them negative as illustrated by the examples of SIM 2019,19 (Table 4.1).
For a third surprisingly large group of projects the effects on the market are
marginal. As Table 4.1 indicates, this is the case for a majority of the projects
in 2019. Overall, 130 out of 171 projects move social welfare in the EU by less
than 10Me/y (Appendix C). As most of the storage expansion projects fall into
this category we can conclude that there is enough storage capacity available to
cover seasonal demand fluctuations and there is no need for additional storage
capacity in most regions –at least in the case of a fully functional market. These
results coincide with the findings of ENTSO-G [16, Chapter 6.2.3] estimating a
storage utilization rate of less than 50%. A notable project in this category is the
recently announced Turkish Stream: although the pipeline will allow Russian
gas to enter the EU from a different angle (and therefore potentially increase
supplier diversification for countries not yet supplied by Russian gas), there
are two major obstacles to overcome: first, the infrastructure within the EU to
bring the additional gas to the larger markets in Western Europe is lacking. The
planned infrastructure in Southeastern Europe, including the TAP, will already
be utilized by the gas arriving from Azerbaijan, and hence, Russian gas can
at most substitute Azeri gas, but cannot increase the shipped quantity overall;
and second, there are shorter and thus cheaper routes to ship Russian gas to
the major consumer markets, namely, via Belarus and the Ukraine. Hence, it is
hard to think of situations in a functioning market in which the Turkish Stream
will be the first choice for shipping Russian gas to the EU. As the capacity limit
of the Turkish Stream pipeline as it is implemented in our model is not reached
by 2022, it is safe to assume that a less restrictive assumption on the pipeline’s
availability and capacity (Section 2.4) does not change the results.
5. Conclusions and Outlook
We analyzed the gas price and consumption development from 2013 to 2022
resulting from changes in demand, production capacity, and infrastructure. We
found that the wholesale prices drop on average over time in all EU markets,
contradicting the trend predicted by the IEA [22]. Furthermore, we observed
that the price levels in the EU have largely converged by 2019. Thus, we envision
that the EU market’s physical integration is completed with the connection of
Finland to the ENTSO-G network in 2019 and, unless there are significant
regional supply shortages or demand increases, there is no reason to expect
prices to spike regionally thereafter.
The benefits of integration are clearly greater in Eastern than in Western
Europe: prices fall more significantly as the newly built infrastructure introduces
new possibilities for arbitrage, which in turn reduces the traders’ profits. This
stimulates consumption and consumer surplus. Furthermore, in the Baltic states
and Finland, the most exposed countries in 2013, the HHI is halved by 2019,
indicating a significant increase in supplier diversity. Some concerns remain
regarding the development of the supplier diversity in Poland, Slovakia, and
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Romania, because these countries import most of their (steadily increasing)
needs from a single supplier throughout the entire simulation horizon.
From our simulation results, we identified three categories of projects re-
garding consumer and producer surplus changes. A first category comprises in-
frastructure expansions bringing additional gas to the EU markets and thereby
increasing consumer surplus significantly. The only project in this group is the
TANAP, which brings gas from Azerbaijan to the EU border in Greece. The
project is part of the “Southern corridor” and is brought on-line in 2019.
The second group comprises projects which are highly beneficial for a sin-
gle country or region, but have minimal or even negative impact on the social
welfare of other European countries. We provided several examples, including
the LNG terminal in Finland or the TAP connecting Italy and Greece. These
projects strengthen the market integration, and thereby lower prices and in-
duce consumption in the destination country. The other countries, however,
face additional competition for the existing gas volumes and as a consequence
experience higher prices and a drop in social welfare.
A third category of projects has only a marginal impact on the market. A
possible explanation for the existence of this group is that these infrastructures
are built for situations which were not analyzed in our study, such as emer-
gency situations. Another explanations is that the infrastructures are used for
activities which are not captured by our model: The pipelines and regasifica-
tion terminals could be used by the consumers to diversify suppliers beyond
the levels assumed in our study, for instance, due to a high perceived risk of
disruptions. A high risk perception could also fuel seasonal gas storage usage.
Furthermore, injection and extraction capacities are potentially expanded for
peak shaving purposes, an effect which is not captured by our model. Either
way, the purpose of the projects which are not utilized under normal operation
should be investigated in a future study.
Finally, we found that most of the big shifts in social welfare originate from
changes in production capacities, demand, and willingness to pay, and not from
infrastructure expansions. Consequently, it may be advisable for the EU to fo-
cus on these aspects, especially after the completion of the internal market in
2019. At the same time, a larger total social welfare is not necessarily beneficial
for all parties involved in gas trade: it largely matters whether consumer or pro-
ducer surplus changes, and in which countries these values change. Furthermore,
the situation for consumers can also be improved by efficiency measures, which
leads to a decrease of social welfare. Future work should elaborate on possi-
ble development paths of the supply-to-demand ratio and assess how producers
and consumers are affected by various scenarios. We also envision additional
research on the costs and benefits of higher production capacities and lower de-
mand within the EU borders. In addition, the combined effects of infrastructure
elements should be assessed in more detail; our results indicate the main regions
of interest.
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Appendix A. Model equations and exemplary market setting
Appendix A is largely reproduced from Baltensperger et al. [3]. We intro-
duce the model equations in Appendix A.1, show an exemplary market setting
with two interconnected nodes in Appendix A.2, and introduce the associated
notation in Appendix A.3. Note that we follow the convention used by Bal-
tensperger et al. [3] and include producers in the notion of service providers,
although producers are not an infrastructure service.
Appendix A.1. Model equations
Equations (A.1) describe the mechanics of the spatial partial equilibrium
model of the European gas market in detail. We refrain from showing the loss
terms in the equations to achieve a more compact notation.
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Appendix A.2. Graphical illustration
Figure A.1: Gas market model with two nodes. P : producer. A: pipeline operator.
L: liquefaction plant operator. B: LNG shipment. R: regasification plant operator.
S: storage operator. C: consumer. Fn: trader associated with producer Pn. Fm:
trader associated with producer Pm. qPfnt: quantity delivered from producer to
trader f at node n in time period t. qA
fnmt
: pipeline transportation of trader f via
arc nm in period t. qB
fnmt
: LNG shipment of trader f via arc nm in period t. qI
fnt
:
storage injection by trader f at node n in period t. qX
fnt
: storage extraction by trader
f at node n in period t. qC
fnt
: sales by trader f to consumer in node n in period t.
The traders Fn and Fm, there decision variables, and their corresponding producers
Pn and Pm are colored red (n) and blue (m), respectively. Service providers, except
producers, and flows between them are marked purple, as well as the consumers,
since all traders trade with them.
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Appendix A.3. Notation
Table A.1: This table introduces the nomenclature concerning service providers,
traders and consumers.
Service providers, traders and consumers
Anm Transmission system operator of pipeline nm
Bnm Shipping company transporting LNG from n to m
Cn Consumer at node n
In Storage operator injecting gas at node n
Ln Liquefaction plant operator at node n
Pn Gas producing company at node n
Rn Regasification plant operator at node n
Sn Storage operator at node n
Fn The trader associated with producer at node n
Xn Storage operator extracting gas at node n
Zz Placeholder for a service provider (Pn, In, Xn, Ln, Rn, Anm, Bnm)
at node n / arc nm
Table A.2: This table introduces all sets used for the mathematical description of
the model.
Sets
t ∈ T = {T1, . . . , Tt¯} A time period t in the set T of all periods of
a year
n,m ∈ N = {N1, . . . , Nn¯} Nodes n,m in the set N of all nodes
n∗(f) ∈ N Node from which trader f draws its gas
f ∈ F = {F1, . . . , Fn¯} A trader f in the set F of all traders
z ∈ Z A node/arc element from the set Z
A ⊂ N ×N Set of arcs connecting 2 nodes by pipeline
B ⊂ N ×N Set of arcs connecting 2 nodes by ship
C ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a consumer is active
I ⊆ N Set of nodes at which storage injection is pos-
sible
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
Sets
L ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a liquefaction terminal
operator is active
P ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a gas producer is active
R ⊆ N Set of nodes at which a regasification terminal
operator is active
X ⊆ N Set of nodes at which storage extraction is
possible
Z ∈ {P ,L,B,R,A, I,X} Placeholder for the set of nodes/arcs at which
a type of service provider is active
A(n) ⊆ N \ {n} Set of nodes which are connected to n by
pipeline
B(n) ⊆ N \ {n} Set of nodes which are connected to n by ship
C(f) ⊆ N The set of all nodes with consumers which are
reachable by trader f
N (f) ⊆ N The set of all nodes which are reachable by
trader f
F(z) The set of all traders active at node/arc z
Z(f) The set of all nodes/arcs in which service Z
is active and are reachable by trader f
Table A.3: The parameters are generally described by capital Roman letters.
Lower-case Roman letters are only chosen if the parameter is directly linked to a
variable of the same name. Occasionally, lower-case Greek letters are chosen to fol-
low conventions. The superscripts indicate whether the parameter is related to a
service provider of type Z ∈ {P, L,B,R,A, I,X} or a consumer C. Subscripts indi-
cate the trader f , node/arc z, and the period of the year t the parameter is related
to.
Parameters
CAP
Z
nt Maximum capacity of service Z located at z in period t
CAP
ZT
n Maximum capacity of service Z located at z over all periods T
ηC0nt Calibrated price elasticity in market n and time period t
ηC,datant Aggregated price elasticity from data for node n and time
period t
INTCnt Maximum willingness to pay (intercept of inverse demand func-
tion with the sCnt = 0 - axis) of consumers at node n in period t
λC0nt Calibrated willingness to pay for s
C0
nt
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Parameters
λC,datant Reported wholesale price levels
LINCZzt Linear cost function term for service Z located at z in period t
LOSSZz Loss factor when using service Z located at z
qC,datafnt Reference gas sales of trader f in node n and time period t
qC,data∗ Adjusted reference gas sales of trader f in node n and time
period t for calibration
QUACZzt Quadratic cost function term for service Z located at z in
period t
sC,datant Reference consumption levels
sC0nt Calibrated consumption levels
SLPCnt Slope of the inverse demand curve of the consumers at node n
in period t, is assumed strictly negative
θfnt Market power parameter of trader f in node n and period t
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Table A.4: The variables are described by lowercase letters. Primal variables are
Roman, while dual variables are Greek letters. The superscripts indicate whether the
variable is related to a service provider of type Z ∈ {P, L,B,R,A, I,X}, a consumer
C, or a node N . Subscripts indicate the trader f the variable corresponds to, at
which node/arc z the transaction or service is located, and in which period of the
year t it takes place.
Variables
qCfnt Flow of trader f to consumer C at node n in period t
qZfzt Flow between trader f and service provider Z at node/arc z in
period t
sCnt Consumption in node n and period t
sZzt Volume flow contracted by service provider Z at node/arc z in
period t
αZzt Congestion fee of service Z located at z in period t
αZTz Congestion fee on annual usage of service Z located at z
φNfnt Dual variable of the volume balance of trader f at node n and
period t
φSfn Dual variable of the annual volume balance of trader f in storage
S at node n
λCnt Wholesale price at node n in period t
Table A.5: This table introduces the functions. The superscripts indicate whether
the function is related to a service provider of type Z ∈ {P,L,B,R,A, I,X}, or a
consumer C. Subscripts indicate at which node n the service/consumer is located,
and in which period of the year t the function is valid.
Functions
cZzt(s
Z
zt) Cost function of service Z at node/arc z in period t.
ΛCnt(s
C
nt) Inverse demand function of consumer C at node n in period t.
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Appendix B. Calibration results
Table B.1: Mean market power parameter values for all traders (T) in all markets
(C). Country abbreviations are given in Table B.2.
❅
❅C
T
AZ DK DZL DZN EG GB LY NG NL NOL NON OM PE QA RU TT YE
BG 0.44 0.69 0.95 0.81 0.44 0.83 0.84 1 0.79 0.44 0.78 0.44 0.44 0.92 0.25 0.44 0.44
CZ 0.19 0 0 0.04 0 0.1 0.18 0 0.13 0 0.15 0 0 0.34 0.36 0 0
EE 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
FI 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
GR 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.83 0.76 0.85 0.8 0.8 0.46 0.94 0.6 0.76 0.64 0.8 0.87 0.79 0.76
HR 0.62 0.9 0.35 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.94 0.64 0.62 0.33 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.62
HU 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.41 0.23 0.4 0.37 0.23 0.45 0.23 0.48 0.23 0.23 0 0.31 0.23 0.23
LT 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
LV 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
PL 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.6 0.26 0.26 0.58 0.26 0.57 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.26 0.26
RO 0.02 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.02 0.02 0 0.03 0.02 0.02
SI 0.71 0.56 0.73 0.73 0.5 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.71
SK 0.34 0.61 0.6 0.84 0.34 0.84 0.92 0.61 0.82 0.34 0.81 0.34 0.34 0.55 0.19 0.34 0.34
AT 0.76 0.66 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.82 0.73 0.53 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.76 0.3 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.76
BE 0.33 0.12 0.59 0.44 0.33 0.72 0.33 0.26 0.16 0.33 0.18 0.33 0.33 0.42 1 0.33 0.33
CH 0.29 0.12 0.28 0.51 0.29 0.5 0.44 0.11 0.1 0 0.27 0.29 0.2 0.34 0.43 0 0.29
DE 0.29 0.19 0.68 0.34 0.19 0.9 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.19 0.19
DK 0.28 0.54 0.17 0.16 0.2 0.27 0.1 0.1 0.28 0 0.34 0.2 0 0.2 0.46 0 0.2
ES 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09 0 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0
FR 0.45 0.89 0.25 0.58 0.24 0.65 0.71 0.46 0.68 0.81 0.31 0.24 0.52 0.62 0.78 0.76 0.24
GB 0.25 0.33 0.47 0.07 0.17 0.4 0 0.3 0.31 0 0.1 0.17 0 0.07 0.44 0 0.17
IE 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.27 0.5 0.27 0.63 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.87 0.27 0.27
IT 0.78 0.93 0.84 0.64 0.66 0.83 0.76 0.87 0.82 0.91 0.77 0.36 1 0.81 0.73 0.88 0.14
LU 0.36 0.19 0.47 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.37 0.15 0.38 0.25 0.33 0.52 0.49 0.16 0.25
NL 0.25 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.21 0.08 0.16 0.27 0.04 0.27 0.18 0 0.14 0.38 0.5 0.18
PT 0.01 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SE 0.39 0.48 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.44 0.09 0 0.45 0.32 0.53 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.64 0.32 0.32
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Table B.2: Country abbreviations.
Eastern EU Western EU Non-EU
consumers consumers suppliers
BG Bulgaria AT Austria AZ Azerbaijan
CZ Czech Republic BE Belgium DZL Algeria (LNG)
EE Estonia CH Switzerland DZN Algeria
(Pipeline)
FI Finland DE Germany EG Egypt
GR Greece DK Denmark LY Libya
HR Croatia ES Spain NG Nigeria
HU Hungary FR France NOL Norway (LNG)
LT Lithuania GB United King-
dom
NON Norway
(Pipeline)
LV Latvia IE Ireland OM Oman
PL Poland IT Italy PE Peru
RO Romania LU Luxembourg QA Qatar
SI Slovenia NL The Nether-
lands
RU Russia
SK Slovakia PT Portugal TT Trinidad & To-
bago
SE Sweden YE Yemen
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Appendix C. Full set of results
Appendix Results full.xlsx contains the full set of results of our simulations.
The six sheets of the file display the consumer and producer surpluses, the
prices, and the consumption both in absolute and relative terms. Table C.1
describes the columns, which are identical on each sheet of the file. The cell
colors highlight the largest positive and negative changes.
Table C.1: Legend for Appendix Results full.xlsx. Columns: indicates the columns
of the Excel file. Description: indicates the possible entries in the respective column
in italics, and describes the meaning thereof.
Column Description
A Index (for sorting purposes)
B Simulation year
C Simulation ID
ID = 0: This line contains the reference simulation.
ID ∈ {1, . . . , 3}: These lines contain results relative to SIMy, 0
ID ∈ {4, . . . , ky}: These lines contain results relative to
SIM y,3
D Simulation type
PL: All production and liquefaction capacities are updated to
the current year levels
C: All values for demand and willingness to pay are updated
to the current year levels
PLC: All production and liquefaction capacities, and all values
for demand and willingness to pay are updated to the current
year level
R: A regasification terminal expansion
S: A storage facility expansion
A: A pipeline expansion
RSA: All regasification, storage, and pipeline capacities are
updated to the current year levels
RSA & PLC: All parameters are updated to the current year
levels
E Reference value for comparison
SIM 0: Values given in column D are relative to SIMy, 0
SIM 3: Values given in column D are relative to SIMy, 3
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – Continued from previous page
Column Description
F (Start) location
G End location
H/J/L Original capacity.
For storage: injection/extraction/volume capacity
I/K/M Added capacity.
For storage: injection/extraction/volume capacity
N-AN Changes in consumer surplus (dCS), prices (dpiC ),
and consumption (dsC ) in the respective countries, see leg-
end of Table B.1 for the country codes. Relative and absolute
changes are given on the different sheets of the file.
AO-BS Changes in producer surplus (dPS) in the respective
countries, see legend of Table B.1 for the country codes. Rela-
tive and absolute changes are given on sheets “Consumer and
Producer Surplus” and “Consumer and Producer Surplus %”,
respectively.
BT-CA (Only for sheets “Consumer and Producer Surplus” and “Con-
sumer and Producer Surplus %”)
dCS: Change in consumer surplus (in the EU; We only analyze
wholesale markets in the EU and therefore cannot give results
for consumer surplus changes outside the EU
dPS EU: Change in producer surplus within the EU
dSW EU: Change in social welfare within the EU (dSW EU =
dCS + dPS EU )
dPS: Change in producer surplus (inside and outside of the
EU)
dSW: Change in social welfare including foreign producers
(dSW = dCS + dPS)
dCS abs sum: Sum of all absolute changes of consumer surplus
dSW EU abs sum: Sum of all absolute changes of social welfare
in the EU
dSW tot abs sum: Sum of all absolute changes of social welfare
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